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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
When experience does not promote 
expertise: security professionals fail to detect 
low prevalence fake IDs
Dawn R. Weatherford* , Devin Roberson and William Blake Erickson 
Abstract 
Professional screeners frequently verify photograph IDs in such industries as professional security, bar tending, and 
sales of age-restricted materials. Moreover, security screening is a vital tool for law enforcement in the search for 
missing or wanted persons. Nevertheless, previous research demonstrates that novice participants fail to spot fake IDs 
when they are rare (i.e., the low prevalence effect; LPE). To address whether this phenomenon also occurs with profes-
sional screeners, we conducted three experiments. Experiment 1 compared security professional and non-profession-
als. Experiment 2 compared bar-security professionals, access-security professionals, and non-professionals. Finally, 
Experiment 3 added a newly created Professional Identity Training Questionnaire to determine whether and how 
aspects of professionals’ employment predict ID-matching accuracy. Across all three experiments, all participants were 
susceptible to the LPE regardless of professional status. Neither length/type of professional experience nor length/
type of training experience affected ID verification performance. We discuss task performance and survey responses 
with aims to acknowledge and address this potential problem in real-world screening scenarios.
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Background
In response to various worldwide security concerns at 
borders and other ports of entry, professional screen-
ers commonly restrict access of goods and services to 
authorized individuals who present an authentic ID card. 
However, a potential traveler may produce stolen, bor-
rowed, or inauthentic documents. Professional screeners 
need to maintain safety by identifying such imposters, 
while still allowing lawful passengers through. Although 
technological advancements such as automatic face rec-
ognition systems (e.g., Taigman et al., 2014) and various 
methods of biometric scanning may seem like attractive 
alternatives to replace human screeners, such technolo-
gies face many of the same challenges as human recog-
nizers (O’Toole et al., 2012; e.g., Tran et al., 2017), while 
also raising concerns about ethics, transparency, and 
accountability (Drozdowski et  al., 2020). Therefore, the 
bulk of imposter detection duties has been and is being 
performed by humans.
Even under optimal viewing conditions, ID matching 
performance has a surprisingly high number of errors 
(e.g., Burton, 2013). Errors further increase with addi-
tional real-world challenges such as time pressure (e.g., 
Bindemann et  al., 2016) and vigilance (e.g., Alenezi 
et  al., 2015). Among a host of challenges to successful 
ID screening, the Low Prevalence Effect (LPE; e.g., Wolfe 
et al., 2007) also increases error rates. As a well-known 
cognitive phenomenon, the LPE has been demonstrated 
for infrequent targets such as objects in a visual array 
(e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007), weapons in luggage X-rays 
(Wolfe et  al., 2013), and most relevant to the current 
investigation, fake IDs (Papesh et  al., 2018; Papesh 
& Goldinger, 2014; Susa et  al., 2019; Weatherford & 
Schein, 2015; Weatherford et  al., 2020; cf. Bindemann 
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tested untrained participants’ ability to make identity 
judgments about a target face presented beside an ID 
card. Fake IDs appeared in either 10%, 50%, or 90% of 
all trials. Consistent with the LPE, participants inac-
curately accepted more fake IDs (i.e., mismatch errors) 
in the 10% prevalence condition. What’s more, perfor-
mance feedback only exacerbated the effect.
Of theoretical interest, research suggests that the 
LPE is caused by early search termination (i.e., mak-
ing a decision before exhausting all available cues) and/
or criterion shifting (i.e., response criterion, as defined 
by signal detection theory, shifts over the course of tri-
als). Although work outside of facial identification has 
demonstrated that early search termination might be 
corrected by allowing participants time to reconsider 
rash decisions (e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007), ID match-
ing tasks have consistently failed to find any evidence 
for early search termination (Papesh & Goldinger, 
2014; Weatherford et al., 2020). In contrast, facial stud-
ies more strongly favor criterion shifting that biases 
acceptance of fake IDs as authentic even with addi-
tional consideration time, warnings about errors, 
bursts of high-prevalence mismatch trials, and other 
manipulations designed to combat criterion shifting. 
In other words, the LPE is an exceptionally stubborn 
source of errors for which we need a greater theoretical 
understanding.
Although LPE tasks in the laboratory (e.g., Papesh & 
Goldinger, 2014; Weatherford et  al., 2020) may be cau-
tiously generalized to other real-world ID matching 
tasks, no studies have directly tested if and whether 
the LPE emerges in an ID matching task with a profes-
sional sample. It is quite possible that this phenomenon 
is an artifact of the untrained participants performing 
tasks with which they may have little to no experience. 
Although it is difficult to estimate exactly how often pro-
fessionals are presented with fake IDs, security screeners 
are likely far more accustomed to seeing an authentic ID 
card presented by its rightful owner, and that expecta-
tion may influence performance on an ID matching task.
Therefore, the current studies report data from pro-
fessional samples on an ecologically valid variant of a 
routine task for which they have extensive experience. 
We hope that results will illuminate if professionals may 
commit LPE errors in a facial identification task.
Mapping a laboratory‑based task 
onto a professional‑security setting
To increase ecological validity and reduce the influence 
of potential confounds associated with laboratory-based 
designs, we modeled our ID matching task to reflect 
essential aspects of a professional-security setting.
Realistic document images
During an ID check in the real world, a screener is 
responsible for satisfying two goals. One goal involves 
authenticating the individual’s documents by visually 
scanning for particular security features such as expi-
ration dates, ghost images, and black-light responsive 
materials. Many different agencies focus exclusively on 
this aspect of the screening process. Continually updated 
patents reflect that improvements in this area focus on 
combating the passage of fraudulent documents as a 
measure to heighten security and stop criminal behav-
ior. The steps needed to complete this goal are relatively 
straightforward, and screeners are sometimes provided 
with tools (e.g., black-light scanners) to aid detection of 
fake IDs. Therefore, we reduced participants’ attention 
to this goal by presenting standardized document images 
for which security features (e.g., expiration dates, ghost 
images) were either removed or held constant to reduce 
possible suspicion of fraudulent documents.
A second goal involves authenticating an individu-
als’ identity by comparing the facial image to the person 
presenting it. The steps needed to complete this goal are 
far more nebulous—but equally, if not more, important. 
A successful screener needs to not only catch fraudu-
lent documents (e.g., presented after printed expiration 
date), but also fraudulent identities (i.e., presented by an 
imposter). As the more abstract of the two tasks, this sec-
ond goal of facial image comparison has been the subject 
of extensive cognitive investigations to reveal the under-
lying mechanisms that predict (or fail to predict) success.
Realistic facial images
Research suggests that although humans possess superior 
facial recognition skills with familiar faces (e.g., Kramer 
et  al., 2018; Young & Burton, 2018), this expertise does 
not completely extend to unfamiliar faces (Abudarham 
et al., 2019; Burton, 2013; Dunn et al., 2018) that would 
be typical for a security-screening scenario. Although 
both processes share some perceptual characteristics 
(e.g., featural analysis, perceptual sensitivity; Abudarham 
et al., 2019), many of the hallmarks of familiar face pro-
cessing revolve around more well-developed conceptual/
associationistic processing that increases the screener’s 
ability to generalize from one image of someone to many 
others. In other words, facial image comparison only 
plays a crucial role when screeners need to authenticate 
the documents of unknown individuals.
Many agencies that produce IDs attempt to reduce or 
eliminate perceptual variations that impair unfamiliar 
face comparison (e.g., Hancock et al., 2000). These vari-
ations including suboptimal lighting/shadows (e.g., Braje 
et  al., 1998), distance (e.g., Lampinen et  al., 2014), pose 
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(e.g., Hancock et  al., 2000), image quality (e.g., Bruce 
et al., 2001), and partial face coverage (e.g., Davies & Flin, 
1984). Accordingly, all facial images used in this series 
of experiments depict a frontal pose of each participant 
under adequate lighting without any obstructions (e.g., 
sunglasses, facial scarves). Further, images were of simi-
lar size and quality to those used in typical screening 
scenarios.
Realistic target comparison images
Even when presented with a facial images are optimized, 
the screening task remains challenging because a person 
may look markedly different from their own ID photo-
graph. Variability over time (e.g., caused by a change in 
hair, weight, or cosmetic alterations) increases within-
person variability. Recently, Weatherford et  al. (2020) 
investigated the relationship between within-person 
variability and the LPE. Over the course of three experi-
ments, the authors replicated the classic LPE, such that 
participants in the low mismatch prevalence condition 
demonstrated lower mismatch accuracy than those in 
medium and high mismatch prevalence conditions. As 
the within-person variability in each experiment was 
increased through the use of photographs that were cap-
tured further apart in time (i.e., from same day images in 
Experiment 1 to images taken at least one year apart in 
Experiment 3), the LPE only became more pronounced. 
Therefore, we removed the possibility that the task would 
be trivially simple by using target comparison images/
videos taken in a different context, with a different cam-
era, and that varied in time by at least six months from 
the facial image on the document.
How professional screening experiences affect 
the LPE
After establishing ecologically valid measures, the cur-
rent study extends beyond student samples reported 
in previous studies (Papesh et  al., 2018; e.g., Papesh & 
Goldinger, 2014; Susa et  al., 2019; Weatherford et  al., 
2020) by recruiting ID screening professionals. Aside 
from training, which has shown mixed results in improv-
ing ID screening accuracy (e.g., Towler et al., 2014, 2019), 
professionals’ routine experience with ID screening may 
affect ID matching accuracy. As no published work has 
examined the relationship between professional experi-
ence and the LPE, two theoretically supported, yet diver-
gent, possibilities may predict facial image comparison 
performance.
Professional experience might reduce LPE errors
In a practical sense, the best-case scenario would involve 
professional improvements in facial comparison perfor-
mance alongside reductions in mismatch LPE errors. 
If experience promotes expertise, then a wide vari-
ety of security professionals should outperform naive, 
untrained participants on both the task itself (i.e., overall 
accuracy), and the detection of fake IDs (i.e., mismatch 
error rate). In the present studies, we focused on facial 
reviewers (i.e., individuals who perform a high volume of 
routine facial comparison tasks within a relatively short 
period of time throughout their entire shift; see also 
FISWG, 2011), as these professionals perform the bulk 
of identification matching operations designed to ensure 
public safety. Occupations such as police officers, secu-
rity guards, border patrol agents, and the like would fit 
within this category.
Concerning overall accuracy, some studies have dem-
onstrated that professional experience improves match-
ing performance (i.e., overall performance on match and 
mismatch trials). These studies typically appeal to bene-
fits by way of quantitative (e.g., years of employment) and 
qualitative (e.g., type and amount of identity compari-
sons made across a variety of contexts) aspects of profes-
sional experience. One illustrative example of improved 
performance involved the comparison of passport issu-
ance officers to novices in a photograph-to- photograph-
ID matching task. Using a relatively large sample size 
(n = 204), Towler et  al. (2019; Experiment 2) found that 
professionals outperformed novices on a photograph-
to-photograph task using unfamiliar faces, with benefits 
modestly increasing in line with the difficulty of the tasks. 
Similar findings using other photograph-to-photograph 
comparisons have also been observed (e.g., Phillips et al., 
2018).
Professional experience might not affect, or might 
exacerbate, LPE errors
While the best-case scenario is attractive, the larger body 
of evidence supports the possibility of a non-significant 
finding. More specifically, several studies assessing facial 
reviewers’ skills (e.g., White et  al., 2014; Papesh et  al., 
2018Heyer et al., 2018; Wirth & Carbon, 2017) were not 
as successful. Professional experience did not improve 
task performance. If the current studies fit within this 
body of work, then we might predict no benefit of profes-
sional experience.
One last theoretical possibility is that professional expe-
rience will exacerbate LPE errors. In the field, it is reason-
able to expect that professionals see a low prevalence of 
fake IDs. This low prevalence likely shifts their criterion, 
thereby tempting a screener to misattribute a high vari-
ability between and ID and its presenter as within-person 
variability (i.e., the differences seen between two images 
of the same person) instead of between-person variability 
(i.e., the similarities seen between two images of different 
people). In other words, when individuals seeking access 
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to restricted goods and services present an ID with large 
differences (e.g., glasses, aging effects, cosmetics), the 
most practical approach would be to assume that vari-
ability is a natural by-product of comparing an individ-
ual to an image from up to ten years ago. If fraudulent 
documents and identities are rare, this heuristic would 
serve to reduce false alarms (i.e., rejecting an authentic 
ID). To the extent that professional experience transfers 
to other identity matching tasks, and those heuristics and 
assumptions remain intact, then professionals may actu-
ally commit more LPE errors than untrained novices. 
Given that several studies have found criterion shifting 
even within a short experimental period (e.g., Papesh 
et  al., 2018; Susa et  al., 2019; Weatherford et  al., 2020), 
it is entirely reasonable that routine, professional experi-
ences could negatively transfer to this new task.
The current studies
In three studies, we manipulated the ratio of fake to 
authentic IDs across participants and expected to repli-
cate previous findings with our non-professional partici-
pants. In the low mismatch condition (i.e., 90% matches 
to 10% mismatches), we predicted that non-professionals 
would identify fake IDs less often. Likewise in the low 
match condition (i.e., 10% matches to 90% mismatches), 
we predicted that non-professionals would identify 
authentic IDs less often. We expected that these differ-
ences, compared to a balanced condition (50% matches 
to 50% mismatches), would be largely driven by criterion 
shifting. In other words, participants in the imbalanced 
conditions would either relax their criteria for a “match” 
decision under the low mismatch prevalence or constrain 
their criteria for a “match” decision under low match 
conditions.
To foreshadow our findings, all of our predictions were 
confirmed for non-professionals. Furthermore, despite 
possible differences to task performance that might be 
expected with professional security experience, profes-
sional status did not affect our pattern of results. Partici-
pants in both types of imbalanced groups (low mismatch 
and low match) produced the typical pattern of the LPE. 
Even though feedback may have heightened awareness of 
the imbalanced base rates (a point we revisit in the Gen-
eral Discussion), the data consistently support no differ-
ences in ID verification performance across professional 
status, type of security occupation, and self-reports of 




Recruitment All participants were recruited through a 
university subject pool or a Qualtrics panel (www. Qualt 
rics. com). Qualtrics recruiting ensured that participants’ 
self-reported age, gender, race/ethnicity, and income gen-
erally reflected established patterns reported in the 2010 
US Census. For specific qualifications, such as profes-
sional security experience, Qualtrics panels use targeted 
marketing to attract participants from specific partners 
with whom they establish relationships and subsequently 
confirm the availability of participants with the requisite 
qualifications for inclusion. Understandably, many of the 
professionals might have been hesitant to provide the 
name of their employer. And, to protect their identities 
under such circumstances as to encourage their honest 
responding, we did not solicit that specific information.
Sample The sample consisted of N = 78 individu-
als. Non-professionals (N = 54; Mage = 37.22  years, 
SD = 14.53; 4 failed to report; 38 females) participated in 
exchange for partial course credit or $6.00 (all compen-
sation rates reported in USD),1 depending upon recruit-
ing source. Professionals (N = 24; Mage = 48.3  years, 
SD = 13.79; 4 failed to report; 7 females) reported at least 
1 year of professional ID card screening experience and 
participated in exchange for between $20 and $30. Both 
groups represented a diverse sample of participants 
(59.0% White/Caucasian, 26.9% Hispanic/Latinx, 11.5% 
Black/African-American, 0% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 
2.6% other).2
Power analysis
In order to determine the appropriate sample size for 
our design, we referred to the documented effect sizes 
in Weatherford et  al. (2020). To capture the interactive 
effect of mismatch prevalence and feedback, we used 
effect sizes from Experiment 2, which used the same 
stimuli as we adopted here: η2 p = 0.16 (with subsequent 
interpretation of values above 0.25 being large, 0.09 being 
medium, and 0.01 being small) which converts to f = 0.44 
(with 0.40 considered large, 0.25 considered medium, and 
0.10 considered small; Cohen, 1988). We conducted an a 
priori power analysis in G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) using 
the statistical test for “ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, 
main effects and interactions” using desired power (1 − 
β probability) of 0.90 and a numerator df of 2. G*Power 
1 Our disparate compensation rates throughout all three experiments repre-
sent an increased incentive for our professional samples, which might have 
otherwise been more challenging to recruit. Increased compensation is stand-
ard practice across many fields who recruit professionals, and we do not see 
any evidence to suggest that it altered participants’ patterns of responding.
2 We recruited our sample to approximate the racial/ethnic and gender 
demographics of the 2010 US Census. Participants were randomly assigned 
to conditions such that aggregate values across all conditions mirror demo-
graphic characteristics within conditions.
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indicated a required sample size of n = 70. Thus, our sam-
ple size of n = 78 exceeded the sample size necessary to 
achieve sufficient power.
Materials
Identity matching task Participants viewed 200 unique 
images of 100 identities from a facial database (Weather-
ford et al., 2016) that approximated the same racial/ethnic 
and gender composition as the 2010 US Census. Each trial 
displayed a static target image (296 × 296 pixels) beside 
another static image embedded in one of six state ID 
templates (200 × 120 pixels) on a black background (see 
Fig. 1). All static images were taken in a controlled envi-
ronment. The target image was taken in front of a blue 
background, and the state ID image was taken in front of 
a white background. The two images were taken with dif-
ferent cameras, in different settings, between six months 
to five years apart.
All image pairs were the same as described in Weath-
erford et  al. (2020), Experiment 2. Among 100 identity 
pairs, we randomly chose 10 to serve as low-prevalence 
targets for the imbalanced conditions (i.e., presented as 
mismatches for the low mismatch prevalence condition 
or matches for the low match prevalence condition). For 
the balanced prevalence condition, we randomly split 
the 100 pairs across two different versions (i.e., the 50 
identity pairs that served as mismatches in one coun-
terbalance variation were displayed as matches in the 
other counterbalance variation). All identities were fully 
counterbalanced across all conditions, such that no par-
ticipant viewed the same image more than once (for 
complete counterbalancing legends, see OSF website 
listed below).
Design and procedure
All participants accessed the ID matching task and 
provided informed consent online through Qual-
trics. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three prevalence conditions (low mismatch/10% mis-
matches; balanced/50% mismatches; or low match/90% 
Fig. 1 Example stimuli of identities used in experiment 1 (top row) and experiments 2 and 3 (bottom row). Experiment 1 presented a still target 
image compared to a state-based photograph ID. Experiments 2 and 3 presented a moving target video compared to a US passport. The left 
column represents match pairs, whereas the right column represents mismatch pairs. All images used with permission
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mismatches) and three feedback conditions (full feed-
back, error-only feedback, or no feedback). On each of 
the 100 trials, participants responded to the question 
“Are these photographs of the same person?” on a 1–6 
scale, with 1 indicating Definitely No and 6 indicating 
Definitely Yes. After making the decision, participants 
in the full feedback condition saw one of four feedback 
statements. After a correct decision, they viewed “You 
rejected a fake ID” for mismatch trials or “You accepted 
an authentic ID” for match trials. After an incorrect deci-
sion, they viewed “You accepted a fake ID” for mismatch 
trials or “You rejected an authentic ID” for match trials. 
Participants in the error-only feedback condition only 
received the feedback statements after incorrect deci-
sions. Participants in the no feedback condition did not 
see any statements about their performance. After 100 
trials, participants provided demographic information, 
were debriefed, and thanked for their time.
Results
Our first experiment supports the conclusion that pro-
fessionals exhibit the LPE, following the same patterns 
as non-professionals, regardless of what type of trial is 
infrequent. In other words, when fake IDs were infre-
quent—mismatch errors rose. When authentic IDs were 
infrequent—match errors rose. Further, the data support 
a criterion shift explanation, as evidenced in Fig.  2 (see 
also, Weatherford et al. 2020).
Analysis of discriminability and response criterion
We first binarized our data into match/mismatch deci-
sions by collapsing across the 1–6 options (see Stanislaw 
& Todorov for comparisons of rating tasks with yes/
no tasks3). We coded yes responses (i.e., Definitely Yes, 
Probably Yes, and Maybe Yes) to the question, “Are these 
photographs of the same person?” as match decisions. 
We coded no responses (i.e., Definitely no, Probably 
No, and Maybe No) as mismatch decisions. Therefore, 
correct responses to match and mismatch trials were 
coded as hits and correct rejections, respectively. Incor-
rect responses to match and mismatch trials were coded 
as misses and false alarms, respectively (although see 
Papesh, 2014, for an alternative coding approach that 
treats successful identification of mismatches as “hits”). 
To account for extreme performance levels (e.g., hit or 
false alarm rates of zero), extreme values were replaced 
by 1–2/N for rates of 1 or 2/N of 0, where N represents 
the number of trials of that type. For ease of compari-
son, the complementary error rates for misses and false 
alarms are depicted in Fig. 2.
We further went on to analyze signal detection meas-
ures of discriminability (d′) and response criterion (C). 
For d′, higher values are interpreted as a greater ability 
to distinguish between match and mismatch trials. For C, 
a value of zero represents no bias toward either match or 
mismatch decisions. However, lower or negative C values 
are interpreted as a greater likelihood of making a match 
decision. In contrast, higher C values are interpreted as a 
greater likelihood of making a mismatch decision.
We conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch, Bal-
anced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Error, Full) × 2 
(Group: Professional, Non-Professional) factorial analy-
sis of variance on discriminability measure d’. As can be 
seen in Fig. 2, the ANOVA revealed that only Prevalence 
significantly affected discriminability, F(2, 58) = 5.61, 
p = 0.006, n2p = 0.160. Tukey’s Bonferroni-corrected 
HSD found that Balanced prevalence yielded greater dis-
criminability than Low Match prevalence (p = 0.02) and 
Low Mismatch prevalence (p = 0.003), which were not 
significantly different from one another. No other factors 
yielded significant main effects or interactions.
We next conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch, 
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Error, 
Full) × 2 (Group: Professional, Non-Professional) facto-
rial analysis of variance on response criterion measure 
C. As predicted, Prevalence significantly affected crite-
rion, F(2, 58) = 14.78, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.334. Tukey’s Bon-
ferroni-corrected HSD found that criterion under Low 
Match prevalence was significantly higher than Balanced 
(p < 0.001) and Low Mismatch prevalence (p < 0.001), 
which were not significantly different from one another. 
Criterion for professionals was marginally higher than 
non-professionals, F (1, 58) = 2.91, p = 0.09. These effects 
were accompanied by a significant Prevalence x Feed-
back interaction, F(4, 58) = 4.63, p = 0.003, n2p = 0.239. 
Planned follow-up comparisons found this interaction 
was driven by significant univariate effects of Feedback 
at Low Mismatch prevalence [F(2, 59) = 5.47, p = 0.007, 
n2p = 0.157], but not other levels of prevalence.
Discussion
Although these initial results seem promising, we sought 
to replicate and extend them to a modified paradigm 
with more externally valid materials. We also differenti-
ated between different types of professional groups, as 
opposed to simply treating all professional experiences 
similarly.
3 For a more nuanced treatment of the data that does not collapse across 
degrees of certainty reflected in participants’ interpretation of differences 
between Definitely, Probably, and Maybe, we also created receiver operat-
ing characteristics (ROC) curves. This approach allowed us to compare par-
tial area under the curve (pAUC) between conditions. The overall pattern of 
results was similar to the signal detection measures reported above. There-
fore, we direct the interested reader to our Additional file  1 for the analysis 
and report of those data.
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Regarding the paradigm modifications, Experiments 2 
and 3 were altered by replacing a) the static target image 
with a video of a person in a frontal pose rotating their 
head from side to side, and b) the state-based driver 
license templates with US passports. First, we justified 
the choice to incorporate video targets by relying upon 
previous research comparing still to moving images (e.g., 
Pike et  al., 1997; Zhao & Bülthoff, 2017). Videos create 
Fig. 2 Average non-professional (left column) and professional (right column) match error rate, mismatch error rate, discriminability, and response 
criterion at each level of prevalence collapsed across feedback conditions from experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SE)
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a richer encoding experience that allows a screener to 
consider additional cues that are unavailable in a static 
image. These additional cues might then become diag-
nostic evidence to support a more informed match or 
mismatch decision (e.g., Pilz et al., 2006). At a theoreti-
cal level, the extant literature in facial identification and 
recognition supports both qualitative and quantitative 
differences that confer advantages in processing for mov-
ing versus still images (Lander et al., 1999; O’Toole et al., 
2002; Thornton & Kourtzi, 2002; Yovel & O’Toole, 2016).
Secondly, we justified the switch to US passports to 
reduce additional attentional demands and perceived 
salience brought about by an inconsistent ID template. 
Using a standardized ID template with blurred type-
face implicitly encourages participants to ignore any 
irrelevant details (e.g., expiration date, name, birthdate; 
see Goal 1 of document authentication as described in 
Introduction) and instead devote attention to facial com-
parison (e.g., comparisons of target video and ID image; 
see Goal 2 of identity authentication as described in 
Introduction).
Our choice to diversify our professional pool was simi-
larly motivated by both theoretical and applied ration-
ales. At a theoretical level, we anticipated that different 
types of professional experience would involve a different 
quantity of experiences with fake identification cards. In 
line with logic laid out in Papesh and Goldinger (2014), 
we anticipated that bar door security professionals would 
likely encounter a higher percentage of fake IDs (in terms 
of both fraudulent documents and/or fraudulent identi-
ties) than access security professionals. If fake IDs are 
more prevalent in their occupational experiences, bar 
door security may be less susceptible to mismatch LPE 
errors. At an applied level, we also anticipated that differ-
ent types of professional experience would also involve a 
different quality of experiences with identification check-
ing more generally. Although much more challenging to 
typify, we anticipated these two types of professionals 
complete their identification checking tasks in, perhaps, 
meaningfully different ways.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 compared performance of non-profession-
als, bar door security professionals, and access security 
professionals on 100 identification trials between a target 
video and a US passport. We predicted that if the relative 
percentage of fraudulent ID cards in their professional 
experience conferred an advantage, then bar door secu-
rity professionals (but not non-professionals or access 
security professionals) would commit fewer mismatch 
LPE errors. However, if these professional experiences 
did not transfer to this identification task, then we would 
predict no significant differences between professionals 
of either type and non-professionals.
Method
Participants
All N = 714 participants were recruited through a Qual-
trics panel (www. Qualt rics. com). Non-Professionals 
(N = 441; Mage = 45.13  years, SD = 11.39; 42 chose not 
to answer; 282 females) participated in exchange for 
$6. Professionals were further divided into two groups. 
Bar security (i.e., panel respondents who self-reported 
as being currently employed as a bouncer or bartender, 
responsible for checking IDs as a routine part of their 
daily duties, with at least one year of professional expe-
rience; N = 138; Mage = 37.18 years, SD = 10.29; 14 chose 
not to answer; 75 females) participated in exchange for 
$20. Access security (i.e., panel respondents who self-
reported as being currently employed as a border patrol 
officer, transportation security officer, police officer, 
or security guard, responsible for checking IDs a rou-
tine part of their daily duties, with at least one year of 
professional experience; N = 135; Mage = 40.96  years, 
SD = 10.33; 15 chose not to answer; 56 females) par-
ticipated in exchange for $30. All groups represented a 
diverse sample of participants (75.1% White/Caucasian, 
4.5% Hispanic/Latinx, 9.1% Black/African-American, 
4.8% Asian/Pacific Islander, 4.8% Multiracial, and 1.1% 
other; 4 participants chose not to answer).
Qualtrics panels operate online, and therefore we 
wanted to be assured that participant data were not con-
taminated by error variance not associated with the task 
at hand. Subsequently, n = 10 participants were excluded 
for failing to comply with instructions (e.g., answering 
“yes” on all image pairs, taking hours to complete a sin-
gle trial). Therefore, the final sample included n = 704 
participants.
Power analysis
Our decision to substantially increase our sample size, 
despite previous power analyses that suggested a smaller 
minimum n, was primarily guided by two factors. First, 
we acknowledged that several studies in the literature 
(e.g., White et  al., 2014) have found no demonstrable 
difference between professionals and non-professionals 
on face matching tasks. However, many studies have 
adopted very conservative approaches to the minimum 
necessary sample size to capture the effect. As such, we 
wanted to err on the side of caution. Second, this video 
task combined with a new type of feedback (described 
in Methods below) is a newly adopted paradigm that has 
not been previously tested on any samples—students, 
professionals, or otherwise. Therefore, we wanted a large 
Page 9 of 27Weatherford et al. Cogn. Research            (2021) 6:25  
enough sample to capture any differing effects of this for-
mat, supposing that those effects exist.
We used G*Power (Faul et  al., 2007) to perform an a 
priori power analysis for “ANOVA: Fixed effect, special, 
main effects and interactions” using a medium effect size 
η2 p = 0.09, which equates to f = 0.314. With power set to 
0.90 and a numerator df of 2, the calculations suggested 
a minimum sample size of n = 132. With this value in 
mind, each group (i.e., non-professional, bar security, and 
access security) meet this minimum threshold to reveal 
an effect if it exists.
Materials
Identity matching task Participants viewed the same 
100 identities from Experiment 1. We replaced the static 
image with a moving target video presented beside a static 
image embedded in a US passport template with Adobe 
Photoshop on a black background (see Fig. 1). All videos 
and images were taken in a controlled environment. The 
target video was taken in front of a blue background in 
which the person turned their head from side to side for 
between 10 and 14 s. The video played continuously in a 
looping fashion until the participant made a decision. The 
US passport ID image was taken in front of a white back-
ground, and the passport template remained unchanged 
from trial to trial. The video and image were taken with 
different cameras, in different settings, between six 
months to five years apart.
Design and procedure
As in Experiment 1, all participants accessed the ID 
matching task and provided informed consent online 
through Qualtrics. All procedures were identical to 
Experiment 1, except that we replaced error-only feed-
back with visual repeat feedback (justified and more 
elaborately discussed in Experiment 2 Discussion). After 
making each decision, participants in the visual repeat 
feedback condition reviewed the trial and were asked to 
consider the similarities (on match trials) or differences 
(on mismatch trials) between the target identity and ID 
card identity before advancing to the next trial.
Results
Replicating the pattern of results from Experiment 1, we 
found no reliable differences between professionals and 
non-professionals: Both groups exhibited the LPE as evi-
denced by differences in discriminability and criterion in 
the low prevalence conditions.
Analysis of discriminability and response criterion
As with Experiment 1, we again began with calculat-
ing and depicting match and mismatch error rates (see 
Fig.  3). Afterward, we conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low 
Mismatch, Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, 
Visual Repeat, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professionals, Bar 
Security, Access Security) factorial analysis of variance 
on discriminability measure d’. As with Experiment 1, the 
factor of note is Prevalence, which significantly affected 
discriminability, F(2, 680) = 25.07, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.069. 
Tukey’s Bonferroni-corrected HSD found that Balanced 
prevalence yielded greater discriminability than Low 
Match prevalence (p < 0.001) and Low Mismatch preva-
lence (p < 0.001), which were not significantly different 
from one another. Feedback also affected discriminability, 
F(2, 680) = 3.89, p = 0.02, n2p = 0.011, although Tukey’s 
HSD comparisons found no differences between indi-
vidual Feedback conditions. Finally, Group also affected 
discriminability, F(2, 680) = 3.19, p = 0.04, n2p = 0.009, 
although Tukey’s HSD comparisons found no differences 
between individual levels of the Group factor. There were 
no significant interactions among these factors.
We next conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch, 
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Visual 
Repeat, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professionals, Bar Secu-
rity, or Access Security) factorial analysis of variance on 
response criterion measure C. As can be seen in Fig.  3, 
criterion shifted primarily due to Prevalence and Feed-
back independently as well as through the interaction of 
these two factors. Prevalence significantly affected cri-
terion, F(2, 680) = 140.46, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.292. Tukey’s 
Bonferroni-corrected HSD tests found significant differ-
ences among all three prevalence conditions (p’s < 0.001). 
Low Match prevalence yielded the highest criterion fol-
lowed by Balanced prevalence and Low Mismatch preva-
lence. Feedback also significantly affected criterion, F(2, 
680) = 5.18, p = 0.006, n2p = 0.015. Tukey’s HSD tests 
found that No Feedback yielded a significantly lower cri-
terion than Full or Visual Repeat Feedback (p’s < 0.002), 
but the latter were not different from one another at the 
adjusted alpha level. These effects were accompanied 
by a significant Prevalence × Feedback interaction, F(4, 
680) = 23.89, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.123. Planned follow-up 
comparisons found this interaction was driven by sig-
nificant univariate effects of Feedback at Low Mismatch 
[F(2, 680) = 17.19, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.048], Balanced [F(2, 
680) = 4.83, p = 0.008, n2p = 0.014] and Low Match 
[F(2, 680) = 32.51, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.087] prevalence 
conditions.
Discussion
Despite the intuition that different types of professional 
experiences may improve detection of fake IDs, our 
results fail to support that position. On the contrary, 
we found that all three groups (non-professionals, bar 
security professionals, and access security profession-
als) largely followed the same patterns. Again, general 
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cognitive mechanisms that predict the LPE more ade-
quately explained our data than alternatives that assume 
different degrees of expertise as a function of different 
professional roles. Of rather small consolation, the only 
difference that emerged between professional groups 
was in response to visual repeat feedback. Whereas the 
Fig. 3 Average non-professional (left column) and professional (right column) match error rate, mismatch error rate, discriminability, and response 
criterion at each level of prevalence and feedback from experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SE)
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low mismatch prevalence bar security professionals per-
formed significantly worse than non-professionals on the 
visual repeat feedback, access security professionals did 
not.
In a sense, the visual feedback condition might be 
argued to provide both feedback (by way of confirming 
or disconfirming the participant’s decision) and atten-
tional training (by cuing attention to either similarities or 
differences after a participant’s decision; see also Papesh 
et al. 2018 for a similar “burst” approach for attentional 
reorientation). Emerging evidence in sustained attention 
(Rothlein et  al., 2018) suggests that task-relevant goals 
extracted from the context (in this case, prevalence rates) 
may promote the formation of attentional templates to 
optimize task performance. In response, participants rely 
upon these templates to reduce the reaction time neces-
sary to make correct decisions. When the base rate for 
matches and mismatches is equivalent, as would be the 
case in the balanced prevalence conditions, then bias-
ing the attentional template toward either similarities or 
differences would not be advantageous. However, when 
base rates are imbalanced, then biasing the attentional 
template be beneficial (see also goal hierarchy; Kluger & 
DeNisi, 1996). This benefit, though, would be theoreti-
cally symmetrical—visual repeating should affect both 
low match and low mismatch prevalence. Given that our 
data do not support this theoretical position, we are hesi-
tant to draw any firm conclusions without replication. As 
a result, we reserve a full conversation of these findings 
for the General Discussion.
Turning to our third and final experiment, we sought 
to replicate the LPE findings and more closely examine 
professional experience. We again adopted the coarse-
grained categorical classification (as authenticated by 
Qualtrics panels) of non-professionals, bar security pro-
fessionals, and access security professionals. However, we 
also included an additional Professional Identity Training 
Questionnaire (PITQ, details in Experiment 3 Methods 
section; see also, Appendix) following the identification 
task. This questionnaire allowed us to characterize secu-
rity professionals beyond a simple job title and occupa-
tional category.
The PITQ includes questions about four major aspects 
of professional experience (1) quantity of identifica-
tion matching experience (e.g., years in occupation, shift 
length, percentage of shift devoted to task), (2) quality 
of identification matching experience (e.g., use of digi-
tal aids, types of image or video comparisons), (3) iden-
tification matching training experience (e.g., length, 
description, practice sessions, feedback), and (4) attitudes 
toward training and feedback (e.g., viewed as beneficial, 
other qualitative details). We reasoned that this infor-
mation would be informative at a descriptive level (i.e., 
fill gaps in general knowledge about these facets of job 
experience) and at an inferential level (i.e., test whether 
professional experience predicts identification-matching 
performance).
As discussed in Introduction, one of the major goals 
of both professional experience and training is to render 
unfamiliar face matching (with which we do not all have 
expertise; cf. super-recognizers; Ramon et  al., 2019a, 
2019b) less error-prone by making it more similar to 
familiar face matching. However, empirical support is 
mixed. Nevertheless, if positions are to be made that pro-
fessionals should gain expertise through years of experi-
ence and training, we reasoned that both should manifest 
in the form of a positive relationship with match hits and 
a negative relationship with mismatch false alarms.
In order for years of experience to improve screen-
ers’ ability to recognize fraudulent identities, and not 
just fraudulent documents, government agencies (e.g., 
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs, 
2020; U.S. Department of State, 2020) have outlined cri-
teria to lessen the deleterious effects of facial variation. 
For example, US Passport facial photographs must meet 
criteria regarding sufficiently high resolution and size, 
standard backgrounds and lighting, front-facing pose 
with squared shoulders, and no accessories that might 
obscure parts of the face (e.g., hats, eyeglasses). This 
standardization serves both goals of authenticating the 
document itself (such that unacceptable photographic 
variations indicate a possibly fraudulent document) and 
authenticating the person presenting it (such that dif-
ferences between the photograph and the person are 
reduced). In line with the differing complexity of the two 
goals of identity screening, the standardized elements of 
an authentic ID are concrete. Documents either do or do 
not possess the security features. Facial comparison is 
more abstract; the same facial features can support both 
match and mismatch decisions across screeners. There-
fore, many screeners may only improve their ability to 
detect fraudulent documents via professional experience, 
without appropriately considering and improving facial 
image comparison.
If a professional is trained, that training should include 
practice and feedback about performance on identify-
ing both fraudulent documents and fraudulent identities. 
This type of training has been implicated as the mecha-
nism by which facial examiners (i.e., a separate class of 
facial comparison professionals who have demonstrated 
expertise as a function of mentorship and a focus on 
exhaustive deliberation) show improved performance 
compared to novices (Phillips et  al., 2018; Towler et  al., 
2017; White et al., 2015). Information about which types 
of professionals complete training, and how often, is lim-
ited and/or kept intentionally private.
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Recent literature, on the other hand, shows that train-
ing sessions for facial reviewers are typically relatively 
short courses (i.e., ranging from 1 h to 5 days) that cus-
tomarily include description of the standard elements of 
the ID document, a brief introduction to facial anatomy, 
and identity screening exercises (e.g., Towler et al., 2019).
Unfortunately, the vast majority of training regimens 
are not research-informed. To improve the detection 
of fraudulent identities, research suggests that training 
exercises should include a variety of facial images (e.g., 
Gentry & Bindemann, 2019) that deviate from the stand-
ardized documents used for ID cards. This image variety 
should represent sufficient within-person variability, rep-
resenting differences in images of the same person, and 
between-person variability, representing differences in 
images of two different people. Training should promote 
high identity-screening accuracy, even when either (a) an 
individual’s visual appearance changes drastically (e.g., 
weight loss/gain, natural aging, cosmetic alterations) 
from their ID facial image over time (Burton, 2013; Bur-
ton et al., 2016; Menon et al., 2015b) or (b) an ID facial 
image looks just as similar to its owner as an imposter.
Experiment 3
To test the possible influence of professional experiences, 
Experiment 3 examined the degree to which responses to 




All N = 1474 participants (none of whom partici-
pated in any of the previous experiments) were 
recruited through a Qualtrics panel (www. Qualt rics. 
com) using the same compensation rates and crite-
ria as Experiment 2. The sample represented non-pro-
fessionals (N = 949;Mage = 49.07  years, SD = 14.81; 
1 chose not to answer; 625 females), bar security 
(N = 208; Mage = 36.95  years, SD = 10.23; 4 chose not 
to answer; 94 females), and access security (N = 317; 
Mage = 41.67 years, SD = 11.50; 122 females). All groups 
represented a diverse sample of participants (76.6% 
White/Caucasian, 8.6% Black/African-American, 4.0% 
Hispanic/Latinx, 4.3% Asian/Pacific Islander, 4.3% Mul-
tiracial, and 1.3% other; 8 participants chose not to 
answer). Twelve participants were excluded from analy-
sis for the same types of instructional compliance viola-
tions as described in Experiment 2. The final sample of 
N = 1462 was subjected to data analysis.
Power analysis
Again, we selected our appropriate sample size based on 
an a priori power analysis. As this final experiment aimed 
to reveal differences between two types of professional 
experience, and included non-professional members 
for comparison, we again saw reason to be conservative 
in our sampling approach. We supposed that the effect 
may be only small to medium between these two pro-
fessional groups. Using a n2p of 0.05 and corresponding 
f = 0.23, we used G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to calculate 
the minimum sample size to reveal an effect with power 
set to 0.90 and numerator df set to 1. Output parameters 
revealed a minimum sample size of n = 202. As our small-
est professional group size was n = 208, all three samples 
were sufficiently large to reveal an effect if it exists.
Materials
Identity matching task Experiment 3 used the same 
identities and materials as Experiment 2.
Professional identity training questionnaire (PITQ) The 
34-item survey (see Appendix) contained 4 sections: (1) 
professional background, (2) professional experience, 
(3) professional training, and (4) attitudes toward train-
ing. The survey included a mix of close-ended and open-
ended questions using a response-contingent presenta-
tion sequence.
Design and procedure
As in Experiments 1 and 2, all participants accessed the 
survey and provided informed consent online through 
Qualtrics. All procedures were identical to Experi-
ment 2, except we replaced visual repeat feedback with 
guided visual feedback. After making an incorrect deci-
sion, participants in the guided visual feedback condition 
reviewed the trial and were asked to consider the similar-
ities (on match trials) or differences (on mismatch trials) 
between the target identity and ID card identity before 
advancing to the next trial. Unlike the visual repeat con-
dition from Experiment 2, visually guided feedback par-
ticipants would automatically advance to the next trial 
if they made correct identity decision. Upon completion 
of the 100 trials, participants then completed the PITQ, 
provided demographic information, were debriefed, and 
thanked for their time.
Results
As in Experiments 1 and 2, professionals and non-pro-
fessionals both exhibited the LPE demonstrated by dif-
ferences in discriminability and criterion when mismatch 
trials were rare. The addition of the Professional Identity 
Training Questionnaire revealed preliminary evidence 
that professionals’ false alarm rates (i.e., tendency to 
respond “match” to mismatch trials) are driven up among 
those who normally use normally additional technologi-
cal aids when making ID verification during their work.
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Analysis of discriminability and response criterion
As with Experiments 1 and 2, we again began by calculat-
ing match and mismatch error rates (see Fig.  3). After-
ward, we conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch, 
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Visually 
Guided, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professional, Bar Secu-
rity, Access Security) factorial analysis of variance on 
discriminability measure d’. As can be seen in Fig. 4, only 
Prevalence significantly affected discriminability, F(2, 
1425) = 9.14, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.013. Tukey’s Bonferroni-
corrected HSD found that Low Mismatch prevalence 
yielded poorer discriminability than Balanced (p < 0.001) 
and Low Match prevalence (p < 0.02), which were not sig-
nificantly different from one another. No other factors 
yielded significant main effects or interactions.
We next conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch, 
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Visually 
Guided, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professional, Bar Secu-
rity, Access Security) factorial analysis of variance on 
response criterion measure C. As can be seen in Fig.  4, 
criterion shifted primarily due to Prevalence and Feed-
back independently as well as through the interaction 
of these two factors. Prevalence significantly affected 
criterion, F(2, 1425) = 169.03, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.192. 
Tukey’s Bonferroni-corrected HSD found that Low Mis-
match prevalence yielded a lower criterion than Balanced 
(p < 0.001) and Low Match prevalence (p < 0.001). In 
turn, Balanced prevalence yielded a lower criterion than 
Low Match prevalence (p < 0.001). Feedback also signifi-
cantly affected criterion, F (2, 1425) = 19.62, p < 0.001, 
n2p = 0.027. Tukey’s HSD tests found that No Feedback 
yielded a significantly lower criterion than Full or Visually 
Guided Feedback (p’s < 0.001), but the latter were not dif-
ferent from one another at the adjusted alpha level. These 
effects were accompanied by a significant Prevalence 
x Feedback interaction, F(4, 1425) = 67.91, p < 0.001, 
n2p = 0.160. Planned follow-up comparisons found this 
interaction was driven by significant univariate effects of 
Feedback at Low Mismatch [F(2, 1425) = 33.11, p < 0.001, 
n2p = 0.044], Balanced [F(2, 1425) = 6.46, p = 0.002, 
n2p = 0.009] and Low Match [F(2, 1425) = 116.57, 
p < 0.001, n n2p = 0.141] prevalence conditions.
Regression analyses on survey responses
One of the major goals of Experiment 3 was to deter-
mine whether aspects of professionals’ employment and 
personal histories predicted success at the ID screening 
task (see descriptive statistics, see Table  1). We carried 
out regression analyses on hits and false alarms between 
bar security and access security professionals. The four 
predictors entered into the models were number of days 
of pre-employment training, duration (in minutes) of 
a typical ID verification shift, duration (in years) of ID 
screening employment, and whether they use any type of 
computerized aid in their ID screening procedures. This 
last predictor was dummy-coded with 0 representing 
"no" responses and 1 representing "yes" responses. Only 
members of the professional sample who indicated that 
they screen IDs as part of their current job (n = 403) were 
included in these  analyses1.
The first regression analysis examined hits. No predic-
tors reached significance, but Years of employment mar-
ginally predicted match hit rate, b = − 0.003, SE = 0.002 
t(402) = − 1.91, p = 0.06, 95% CI [− 0.005, 0.000]. Addi-
tional information can be found in Table 2.
The second regression analysis examined false alarms 
to mismatches. Use of digital aids in ID screening pos-
itively predicted mismatch false alarms, b = 0.118, 
SE = 0.037 t(402) = 3.22, p = 0.001, 95% CI [0.046, 0.190], 
meaning that those professionals who use some kind of 
computerized assistance when checking IDs on the job 
were more likely to commit errors in our mismatch trials 
(see Fig. 5). No other predictors reached significance.
Discussion
Once again, professional screening experience did not 
improve identity-matching performance. Instead, Experi-
ment 3 largely replicated the pattern of the two previous 
studies: professionals commit the LPE at similar rates as 
non-professionals. We more closely examined nuance 
among facial reviewers in terms of training, typical iden-
tification matching duties, and digital additions (e.g., 
technological aids). Despite our attempts to more clearly 
define the roles and relationship between professional 
experience and the LPE, none of the following question-
naire components predicted improvements in overall 
performance or mismatch LPE errors. To be fair, years 
of experience suggested moderate prediction of match 
performance, but that relationship was weak and perhaps 
unreliable given the large sample size. We would need to 
replicate this finding at a more stringent alpha level in 
order to have more trust in its reliability.
The large sample size, on the other hand, did allow for 
more variability in responses to the PITQ. Using a close-
ended and open-ended approach, participants provided 
both presence/absence responses (e.g., did you experi-
ence any professional identity training?) as well as follow-
up details (e.g., if yes, please explain). The quantitative 
responses allowed for our inferential analysis above, but 
the qualitative results may also be seen as informative 
(for access to all responses, see OSF website listed below).
The only question that predicted mismatch errors was 
the use of digital aids: professionals who reported using 
them actually produced more mismatch errors than 
those who did not (or non-professionals). This finding is 
striking and worthy of additional consideration. Among 
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Fig. 4 Average non-professional (left column) and professional (right column) match error rate, mismatch error rate, discriminability, and response 
criterion at each level of prevalence and feedback from experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SE)
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those who thoroughly described these tools, reports 
varied from tools for verifying authenticity of docu-
ments (e.g., watermarks, special inks, etc.) to automatic 
facial matching against mugshot databases. We hesitate 
to make claims about specific tools, as our experiment 
was not devised to systematically test the effects of 
specific pieces of software. Nonetheless, to the extent 
that these digital aids are designed to improve identifi-
cation-matching performance, our results suggest that 
such resources could be more wisely invested in other 
professional improvement approaches that benefit pub-
lic safety. We explore possible mechanisms behind this 
result and recommendations in the General Discussion.
Table 1 Demographic characteristics and survey responses from 
security officers and bartenders in experiment 3







Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander 13 10
Other/chose not to respond 19 18





Airport security 21 -
Border patrol officer 17 -
Police officer 120 -
Security guard 151 -
Other 7 -
Years working
 < 1 27 38
1 to 5 77 82
5 to 10 75 57
 > 10 138 26
Mean (SD) 10.36 (8.83) 6.57 (6.67)
Typical work shift length
Mean (SD) 9.10 (2.29) 8.19 (2.20)
Screens IDs as current job duty 239 164
Mean (SD) years in this position 8.17 (8.06) 5.27 (5.18)
Mean (SD) minutes screening IDs in 
work shift
212.06 (250.99) 252.56 (294.39)
Received training 83 52
Mean (SD) days training 8.75 (9.50) 2.18 (4.92)
Undergoes practice sessions 70 43
Receives feedback on ID screening 55 42






Uses digital aids 35 27
Table 2 Multiple regression results for relevant survey predictors 
for committing hit and false alarm decisions in the ID matching 
task used in experiment 3
*Indicates significant prediction p < .05
† Indicates marginal prediction p < .06
b SE b β
Outcome: match hits
Days of pre-employment ID-screening training .00 .02 − .01
Years of ID-screening experience .00 .00 − .10†
Minutes of ID-screening during typical work shift .00 .00 − .03
Use of digital aids in screening (0 = No, 1 = Yes) .03 .03 .05
Outcome: mismatch false alarms
Days of ID-screening training .02 .03 .03
Years of ID-screening experience .00 .00 − .01
Minutes of ID-screening during typical shift .00 .00 .02
Use of digital aids in screening (0 = No, 1 = Yes) .12 .04 .17*
Fig. 5 Average professional hit and false alarm rates among those 
who reported normally using technology and those who do not in 
experiment 3. Hits are derived from correct match trial responses, and 
false alarms are derived from incorrect mismatch trial responses. Data 
are collapsed across prevalence and feedback conditions. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean (SE)
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General discussion
Across three studies, we more thoroughly investigated 
the role of professional experience in an ID screening 
task comprised of different ratios of matched and mis-
matched face pairs. In Experiment 1, we replicated the 
findings of Weatherford et al. (2020; Experiment 2) using 
static stimuli and US driver licenses. We incorporated 
feedback as a possible intervention: full feedback after 
every trial, feedback only after error trials, or no feed-
back. In Experiment 2, we more strongly approximated 
a real-world context by including video targets compared 
with standardized US passports. We also incorporated 
forms of visual feedback that were designed to reduce the 
LPE in all samples (professional and otherwise) by dis-
rupting attentional templates and criterion shifting that 
drive the LPE. Further, we subdivided types of profes-
sional experience into two broad categories: bar security 
and access security. Finally, Experiment 3 adopted the 
same video target paradigm as Experiment 2 and intro-
duced a response-contingent visual feedback condition 
(as opposed to the visual repeat condition in E2). Most 
importantly, we integrated a professional identity train-
ing questionnaire (PITQ) to more closely consider the 
relationship between task performance and different fac-
ets of professional experience.
All three studies supported the same broad outcomes: 
1) professionals suffer from LPE mismatch errors to 
the same extent as non-trained members of the gen-
eral public, 2) various forms of feedback and corrective 
intervention do not reliably ameliorate the LPE, and 3) 
self- reported differences in professional experience and 
training do not confer the expertise necessary to combat 
this problem, and may actually deteriorate performance 
in some cases.
On the face of it, these results may seem disheartening 
to both face researchers and security practitioners. How-
ever, closer analysis of these findings allows us to draw 
two firm conclusions that warrant additional considera-
tion. First, the failure to identify low prevalence fake IDs 
represents a serious real-world problem that may com-
promise job performance and public safety. Second, the 
nature of professional experience (Balsdon et  al., 2018; 
Towler et al., 2018, 2019) can offer key insights into the 
important role of empirically informed training and men-
torship to promote improvements in facial identification 
performance that combat the LPE.
Fake IDs pose a serious security threat
To the extent that cognitive biases revealed by basic 
research findings apply to the real world, the LPE rep-
resents a serious problem for ID verification. By all esti-
mates, imposters rarely present fraudulent documents 
at security checkpoints. If human screeners are not 
adequately prepared to detect imposters, then research-
ers need to partner with practitioners to address this 
problem.
As an attempt to increase the efficacy of job perfor-
mance, many professionals use digital aids. Several 
currently adopted technologies credit earlier military 
technology, such as the Biometric Automated Toolset 
(BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection 
Equipment (HIIDE; Xml et al., 2007). These tools assume 
that routine checks of individuals need only involve the 
human screener. However, under conditions when a 
database of biometric information suggests additional 
scrutiny, individuals under suspicion of criminal activ-
ity may be flagged on the basis of fingerprints, iris scans, 
facial photographs, gait patterns, and/or biographical 
information that matches established databases. In order 
for these tools to be effective, human screeners must have 
consistent access to the technology and databases must 
be constantly updated (a standard that would be difficult 
for any agency to meet).
Experiment 3 found that professionals who indicated 
use of digital aids tended to commit more mismatch 
errors than professionals who did not. These digital aids, 
and the extent to which they are used, varied among 
respondents. Therefore, we hesitate to draw firm conclu-
sions about any specific tools used by professional secu-
rity personnel.4 However, research elsewhere in applied 
cognition has found that even pristinely accurate digi-
tal tools can disrupt user cognition. For example, use 
of global positioning software can disrupt participants’ 
cognitive map formation, leading to poorer wayfind-
ing later without such software compared to those who 
learned topographies through experience alone (Ishikawa 
et al., 2008; Minaei, 2014). Both this set of findings and 
our own imply that domain-specific digital tools may aid 
those using them in the moment, but may deleteriously 
affect learning.
Future research should explore the magnitudes of 
these tools’ various effects on identity matching ability. 
For other visual search tasks, such as baggage screen-
ing (e.g., Huegli et al., 2020), automation might improve 
screener performance. However, visually searching facial 
cues is fundamentally different than visually search-
ing object cues (e.g., Curby & Gauthier, 2010; McKone 
et al., 2007). Computer aids may yield a higher success-
ful detection rate for concrete aspects of the document 
itself; however, human screeners still outperform many 
algorithms on more nebulous visual cues associated with 
identity (e.g., Phillips & O’Toole, 2014). Digital aids may 
4 Tools described by respondents varied in function from document verifica-
tion (i.e., determining whether the identification document is a legitimately 
government-issued) to facial identity verification aids.
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focus attentional resources on identifying fraudulent 
documents (e.g., black light scanners) at the expense of 
identifying fraudulent identities. To the extent that an 
ID is judged as an authentic document by the digital aid, 
experiments could explore whether confirmation bias 
(e.g., Rajsic et  al., 2015) guides visual search by attenu-
ating goal-directed attention after the first goal is satis-
fied (see also, multiple target search satisfaction; Adamo 
et al., 2019; Biggs & Mitroff, 2014; Cain & Mitroff, 2013; 
Thornton & Gilden, 2007). Although criterion shifting is 
a well-known source of LPE errors in facial comparison 
tasks, these real-world possibilities may also lend support 
to additional errors driven by early search termination.
One justifiable recruiting expense may be to solicit 
assistance from individuals with superior facial recogni-
tion skills (e.g., super-recognizers; SRs; Davis et al., 2016; 
Ramon et  al., 2019a, 2019b; Russell et  al., 2009). Stud-
ies show that super recognizers may not be fully aware 
of their skills (i.e., limited metacognitive awareness; e.g., 
Bate & Dudfield, 2019) and fail to adequately calibrate 
their confidence in response to face-matching decisions 
(e.g., Gettleman et  al., 2020; Ramon et  al., 2019a). Even 
more challenging, SRs might not take interest in security 
screening, regardless of their enhanced abilities. There-
fore, recruiting identity screeners in professional circles 
may be problematic. Nonetheless, working with super 
recognizers offers a potentially promising way forward, 
as these individuals are more successful at recognizing 
faces despite common sources of within-person vari-
ability such as age gaps, day-to-day changes in facial hair 
or makeup, and suboptimal viewing conditions (Bate, 
Frowd, et  al., 2019b; Ramon et  al., 2019a; Stacchi et  al., 
2020; although SRs still suffer from Own Race Bias; Bate, 
Bennetts, et al., 2019a). These challenges to face match-
ing are typical for professional screeners, given that many 
identification documents (e.g., US Passports) are valid for 
up to ten years, during which time any bearer of an ID 
would undergo some substantive visual changes. To the 
extent that these types of skills can be trained, the most 
advantageous role for SRs might be to inform facial com-
parison training.
Feedback contributes to low prevalence errors
As a general pattern, our data (see also, Papesh et  al., 
2018) do not support the use of feedback as an interven-
tion to combat the LPE. When match and mismatch tri-
als were imbalanced, participants’ criterion shifted with 
explicit feedback (see Experiment 3 data for strongest 
evidence of the crossover interaction). In a sense, this 
finding is ideal because trial-by-trial feedback would be 
impossible in real-world security settings. If the “ground 
truth” were known about the accuracy of a human 
screener’s decision, there would be no need for the 
human screener.
Interestingly, this pattern is not unique to ID match-
ing tasks. Coining the term Prevalence-Induced Concept 
Change (PICC), Levari et  al. (2018) reported data that 
might shed light on the theoretical mechanisms driving 
the differences. PICC posits that low prevalence prompts 
observers use their own implicit feedback (on the basis of 
their own imbalanced responding) to expand the bound-
aries of an ambiguous concept (e.g., color labels across a 
spectrum, facial expressions that signal threat) by shifting 
their criterion to consider more stimuli as exemplars of 
an infrequent category. For instance, after establishing a 
balanced prevalence between colored dots ranging from 
“mostly blue” to “mostly purple,” participants were more 
likely to miscategorize colors in the purple range as blue 
when blue stimuli became infrequent. If training regi-
mens could successfully establish and maintain an expec-
tation for balanced prevalence rates between authentic 
and fake IDs (or integrate high-prevalence bursts, e.g., 
Papesh et al., 2018), human screeners might prefer com-
mitting a false negative (i.e., rejecting an authentic ID) 
over a false positive (i.e., accepting a fake ID). However, 
more research would need to test this possibility before 
making training recommendations.
Training to combat this problem needs to be intentional 
and research‑informed
As corroborated by our PITQ findings, many employers 
invest substantial resources to improve facial review-
ers’ performance on their routine screening tasks. While 
research-informed training is showing early success for 
other professional search domains within airport secu-
rity (Biggs et al., 2018; e.g., Biggs & Mitroff, 2019; Swann 
et al., 2019), findings within facial comparison screening 
remain mixed (e.g., Towler et al., 2019). Outside of train-
ing that focuses on authenticating documents, which may 
lead to confirmation bias issues, any successful training 
regimen must meaningfully nurture a screener’s abil-
ity to differentiate within-person variability under cir-
cumstances when someone presents a genuine ID from 
between-person variability when someone presents an 
imposter ID. In order for training and on-the-job expe-
rience to promote facial comparison expertise (White 
et al., 2015), the training needs to include (a) images with 
facial variability (e.g., Kramer & Ritchie, 2016; Matthews 
& Mondloch, 2018; Menon et  al., 2015a) such as the 
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly facial training set (Phillips 
et al., 2012), (b) guided mentorship (see FISWG, 2011 cri-
teria for facial examiners), and (c) an emphasis on accu-
racy over speed.
Relatedly, research needs to more strongly examine 
how training and professional experience transfer to job 
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performance. Despite extensive previous experience with 
imbalanced ratios of authentic to fraudulent ID cards, our 
professionals did not apply of their knowledge of real-
world base rates to the experimental task (which would 
have otherwise made their performance worse than non-
professionals). One possibility is that professionals may 
compartmentalize the experimental/training scenario as 
related, but distinct, from the actual screening task itself. 
If that lack of transfer can account for our findings, future 
research should explore how training performance actu-
ally predicts real-world performance before making spe-
cific recommendations.
Conclusions
To conclude, our results reveal that professionals and 
non-professionals do not differ in their ID matching abil-
ities. When professionals make errors, it is likely due to 
limited metacognitive awareness of their error rates and 
their possible reliance upon digital aids, which is espe-
cially pronounced when we only examine low prevalence 
conditions. Future research should explore the extent 
to which professional screeners may merely invest their 
resources to verifying the authenticity of the document 
itself rather than the identity, and how they calibrate their 
confidence in their identity matching decisions.
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Appendix
Professional Identity Training Questionnaire (PITQ)





2. What is your race/ethnicity? Please check all that apply.
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino




3. If Other, please specify:
4. What is your age?
5. Select a category that best fits your occupation. (If Unemployed is selected, skip to question 
12)
Administration and Business Management
Education and Training
Finance
Health Care and Social Services
Hospitality and Tourism
Sales and Retail Services
Security Personnel and Law Enforcement
Self-employed
Transportation and Public Safety
Other
Unemployed
6. If Other, please specify:
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8. If greater than 12, please type number of hours:
























10. If less than 1, please type number of months.
11. If greater than 20, please list number of years.
12. Is (Has) verifying a person's identification ever been part of your employment duties? (If No
is selected, skip to end of survey)
Yes
No
13. If yes, please explain:




15. If yes, please explain:

























17. If less than 1 year, please list in number of months.
18. If greater than 20 years, please type number of years.








21. If yes, please explain:











































Page 24 of 27Weatherford et al. Cogn. Research            (2021) 6:25 
23. If greater than 30 days, please describe:




25. If yes, please explain:
26. Do/Did you receive any feedback on your identity matching or verification accuracy?
oYes
oNo
27. If yes, please explain:
28. Do you think that regular identity matching or verification practice with feedback would be 
beneficial to employee job performance?
oYes
oNo
29. If yes, please explain:
30. When performing identity matching or verification, how do/did you verify the identity of a 
person? Please check all that apply.
person to photo ID
photo to photo ID
video footage to person
video footage to photo ID
person to person
31. Do/Did you utilize any digital facial recognition technology?
oYes
oNo
32. If yes, please explain:
33. Did you receive any special training to operate this technology?
oYes
oNo
34. If yes, please explain:
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